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WORLDWIDE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WTO’S FAILURE TO
CREATE AN INFRASTRUCTURE THAT DELIVERS
PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Arun J. Mohan∗
ABSTRACT
In response to the public outcry over the death of millions of people in
developing countries because of a lack of access to life-saving drugs, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) recognized the need for developing
countries to obtain pharmaceutical drugs at a reduced rate. However, the
WTO received significant pushback from patent holders and pharmaceutical
companies who insisted that their patents be upheld in every country. The
dilemma resulted in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement. The WTO attempted to enforce intellectual property while,
at the same time, “protect[ing] public health and nutrition.” This agreement
became the subject of intense debate and led to a declaration by the WTO in
2001 (the Doha Declaration) that clarified the need for developing countries to
obtain pharmaceutical drugs. A further declaration in 2003 set forth a system
to let developing countries obtain drugs from developed countries by
importation from these developed countries. Despite these efforts, millions of
people are still dying because of a lack of access to pharmaceutical drugs.
Furthermore, patent holders’ rights are being violated and the progress of
research is being stunted by this violation. The only cure for the failure of the
TRIPS Agreement and subsequent WTO actions is for the international
community to set up a body that oversees the distribution of drugs to
developing countries only when national health emergencies occur.

∗ Arun Mohan received a B.S. in Biological Sciences from Cornell University and a J.D. from Michigan
State University College of Law. He is currently an associate at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A. The author
would like to dedicate this paper to his mother, father, and sister.
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INTRODUCTION
Millions of people are dying. They are dying from an epidemic that the
civilized world is not discussing. These people are dying in developing
countries from diseases that are normally easily treatable by pharmaceutical
drugs. These countries cannot afford to pay the high price that pharmaceutical
companies and patent holders charge for the drugs that most people in
developed countries take for granted. You would think that a humanitarian
outcry would force these companies and developed countries to allow the
drugs to be provided to the poor at a cheaper cost.
You would be only half-correct, though. In 1994, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) recognized the need for third world countries to obtain
pharmaceutical drugs at a reduced rate.1 However, the WTO received
significant pushback from patent holders and pharmaceutical companies who
insisted that their patent rights be upheld in every country.2 The dilemma
resulted in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement.3 The WTO attempted to enforce intellectual property rights while,
at the same time, “protect[ing] public health and nutrition.”4 This agreement
became the subject of intense debate and litigation, and led to a declaration by
the WTO in 2001 that reinforced the need for developing countries to obtain
pharmaceutical drugs.5 A further declaration in 2003 set forth a system to
allow developing countries to obtain drugs from developed countries by
importation from these developed countries.6
Despite the attempts by the WTO, millions of people in developing
countries are still needlessly dying from a lack of access to pharmaceutical
drugs.7 This article will describe the continuing failure of the WTO to address
this issue and propose regulations that would both uphold patent rights as well
as give developing countries greater access to lifesaving drugs. Part I of this
1 See Clark A.D. Wilson, The Trips Agreement: Is It Beneficial to the Developing World, or Simply A
Tool Used to Protect Pharmaceutical Profits for Developed World Manufacturers?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
243, 244–46 (2005).
2 See id. at 245.
3 Id. at 244–45.
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 7, 8, Apr. 15, 1994,1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
5 Wilson, supra note 1, at 248.
6 Brittany Whobrey, International Patent Law and Public Health: Analyzing TRIPS’ Effect on Access to
Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 623, 636–37 (2007).
7 Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International
Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 193, 251 (2005).
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article will explain the actions of the WTO in its attempt to address a
worldwide health crisis as well as uphold patent holder’s rights. Part II will
explain the options that currently exist for developing countries to obtain drugs
from patent holders and pharmaceutical companies. Part III will explain how
these options fail to significantly increase access of drugs to developing
counties. Part IV will propose changes in regulations that could lower the
barriers that prevent people from receiving life-saving drugs while, at the same
time, protect the rights of patent holders. I conclude that an international body
must be established to oversee the distribution of life-saving drugs to
developing countries and to guard the rights of the patent holders.
I. THE WTO’S ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS A WORLDWIDE HEALTH CRISIS
Prior to 1994, the struggle for developing countries to gain access to
pharmaceutical drugs and basic patented technologies existed primarily for
four reasons:
First, varying levels of IP protection affect these countries’ access to
biotechnology. Strong IP protection renders products too expensive
for developing countries and prevents researchers from gaining
access to basic knowledge. Conversely, weak IP protection
discourages technology transfer, foreign investment, and local
creation. Second, developing countries lack the infrastructure, capital,
and pool of trained scientists necessary to develop their own
biotechnology products. Third, the private industry, which conducts
the most biotechnology R&D, is motivated by profit and sees no
market in developing countries. Finally, anti-biotechnology groups
object to increasing developing countries’ access to biotechnology.8

Because of these barriers, many countries allowed local production of generic
versions of these patented medications in violation of international law.9
Despite this attempt by developing countries to provide life saving drugs to its
people at a lower cost, people continued to be unable to receive the drugs
needed to treat life-threatening diseases.10 As a result, people in developing
countries continued to die from both terminal diseases and—even more
8 Tara Kowalski, International Patent Rights and Biotechnology: Should the United States Promote
Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 41, 48 (2002).
9 Amit Gupta, Patent Rights on Pharmaceutical Products and Affordable Drugs: Can TRIPS Provide a
Solution?, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 127, 127–28 (2004).
10 See Outterson, supra note 7, at 251 (stating that, of the estimated 5.5 million people living with
HIV/AIDS in developing countries, only five percent currently receive the drugs necessary to treat the
disease).
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astonishing—curable diseases at a greater rate than those people in developed
countries.11
Conversely, pharmaceutical companies received no benefits from their
patented drugs because the cost of these generic drugs in these countries was
considerably lower than the patented drugs sold by the pharmaceutical
companies in developed countries.12 Consequently, both developing countries
and pharmaceutical companies had an interest in developing an international
trade agreement that would both provide lifesaving medications to the people
who need them as well as protect the patent holder’s rights to these drugs.13
A. The TRIPS Agreement
In 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) sought to create a
framework that would balance patent protection for the pharmaceutical
companies and improve access to lifesaving drugs for developing countries.14
Negotiations between all interested countries in the WTO resulted in the
formation of a patent protection system described in “The Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (TRIPS).15 The agreement
was signed by 125 countries and created “a minimum standard for state
intellectual property regulations.”16
The preamble of TRIPS provides that the goal of the agreement is “to
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into
account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade.”17 Furthermore, a provision of Article 8 addresses the impact of

11 Wilson, supra note 1, at 251 (stating that “nearly ten million people die in the developing world each
year from infectious diseases” and “[m]ost of these people die from just six conditions: HIV/AIDS, malaria,
measles, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and various forms of dysentery”).
12 Alan O. Sykes, Trips, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution”, 3 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 47, 47 (2002) (noting that “150 mg of the HIV drug flucanozole costs $55 in India, where the drug
does not enjoy patent protection, compared to $697 in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia, and $817 in the
Philippines, where the drug is patented”).
13 Whobrey, supra note 6, at 624–25.
14 Id. at 625, 630.
15 Gupta, supra note 9, at 127.
16 Ryann Beck, Farmers’ Rights and Open Source Licensing, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 167, 188
(2011).
17 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 30.
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intellectual property rights on the public health.18 Specifically, Article 8 states
that members are able to “adopt measures to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of th[e] agreement.”19
In attempting to balance the social welfare of developing countries against
the need for patent protection, TRIPS both enforces the patent holders right to
“prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing” their products20 while, at the
same time, states that the patent protection should be “conducive to social and
economic welfare.”21 The agreement attempts to provide guidance for when
the rights of the patent holders could be put aside for the greater good of
welfare.22 Article 30 of TRIPS specifically states:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.23

As will be discussed in greater length in Part III.A. of this paper, Article 31
describes the mechanism of compulsory licensing, which allows the
developing countries to utilize the subject matter of the patent without the
patent holder’s permission.24 However, the TRIPS Agreement is clear that
compulsory licenses should only be used to produce drugs for domestic
purposes.25 Thus, the developing country would need to have the
manufacturing capacity and infrastructure to produce these drugs.26 Most
important, unlike previous attempts to provide patent protection, the TRIPS
Agreement sets up a dispute settlement process where developed countries can
18 Marla L. Mellino, The TRIPS Agreement: Helping or Hurting Least Developed Countries’ Access to
Essential Pharmaceuticals?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1349, 1355 (2010).
19 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8.
20 Id. art. 28.
21 Id. art. 7.
22 See id.; Neel Maitra, Access to Environmentally Sound Technology in the Developing World: A
Proposed Alternative to Compulsory Licensing, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 407, 415 (2010).
23 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 30.
24 Maitra, supra note 22, at 416.
25 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31(f) (stating that “any such use [of drugs via a compulsory
license] shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing
such use”).
26 Whobrey, supra note 6, at 636.
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bring claims against other countries for failing to uphold the patent protection
provisions in the agreement and, if the claims are not resolved, sanctions will
be instituted.27
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement leaves open another avenue, known as
“parallel importation,” for developing countries to obtain pharmaceutical drugs
at a cheaper price.28 Under this practice, which is neither explicitly prohibited
nor condoned in the TRIPS Agreement, “goods are sold into a parallel market
at a much cheaper price than they could have been sold through the patent
owner.”29 This practice will be explained in Part III.B. of this Article.
After the passage of the TRIPS Agreement, many critics argued that the
agreement would do nothing to ensure that drugs would be made more readily
available to developing countries and that the agreement simply reinforced the
standard that the developed countries’ goals were paramount to those of
developing countries.30 For example, critics pointed to Article 1(1) of the
TRIPS Agreement, which provides that members “shall be free to determine
the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within their own legal system and practice.”31 Critics argued that, by giving
both developing and developed countries the ability to decide for themselves
how to implement the agreement, the WTO was neither providing any
direction as to when developing countries are considered to be in a public
health emergency nor describing when developed countries would be able to
enforce their patent rights.32
B. The Doha Declaration
Due to the concerns about the inequity between patent holder’s rights and
the public health need for pharmaceuticals, the WTO issued a clarification of
the TRIPS Agreement in 2001 during a conference in Doha, Qatar.33 This

27 Sara DeForge, A Tough Pill to Swallow: The United States’ Passive Efforts in Curtailing Intellectual
Property Rights in Favor of Humanity, 4 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 75, 77–78 (2004).
28 Mellino, supra note 18, at 1357.
29 Id.
30 DeForge, supra note 27, at 78 (stating that “[c]ritics claim [TRIPS] ‘was a result of the efforts of
industrialized and developed nations to ensure that their goals were met over those of developing countries’”).
31 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1.
32 Gupta, supra note 9, at 135–36, 138 (noting that “provisions of the TRIPS can be interpreted to allow
member countries flexibility in balancing their obligations to accord exclusive patent rights in fulfillment of
their obligations to protect the right to health”).
33 Whobrey, supra note 6, at 635.
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clarification, known as the “Doha Declaration,”34 stressed that the TRIPS
Agreement should be “part of the wider national and international action to
address” the public health crisis in third world countries,35 and maintained that
the flexibilities given to these developing countries include the use of
compulsory licenses.36 The declaration was clear in its stance that the TRIPS
Agreement should specifically be used to help those developing countries that
have epidemics of “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, [and] malaria.”37
Perhaps the most important provision of the Doha Declaration was the
WTO’s recognition that some developing countries have “insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” to make “effective use
of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”38 The WTO instructed
the Council for TRIPS to find a way for these countries to acquire drugs
through an avenue that did not include compulsory licenses.39 The solution to
the problem outlined in Paragraph 6 of the agreement was finally provided by
the TRIPS council on August 30, 2003.40
C. The WTO’S 2003 Declaration on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
The “2003 Declaration” provided by the WTO altered Article 31(f)’s
specification that “compulsory licensing must be predominately for the supply
of the domestic market” in regards to countries that did not have the
manufacturing capabilities to supply their people with drugs domestically.41
Prior to 2003, countries with sufficient manufacturing capabilities could not
export pharmaceutical drugs to developing countries that did not have
sufficient manufacturing capabilities because these exported drugs would not
be supplied to that exporting country’s “domestic market.”42 Accordingly, the
2003 Declaration granted these exporting countries a waiver “with respect to
the grant by it of a compulsory license to the extent necessary for the purposes

34 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 I.L.M.
746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
35 Id. para. 2.
36 Id. para. 5.
37 Id. para. 1.
38 Id. para. 6.
39 See Stephanie A. Barbosa, Implementation of the Doha Declaration: Its Impact on American
Pharmaceuticals, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 205, 206, 213–14 (2004).
40 Kojo Yelpaala, Quo Vadis WTO? The Threat of Trips and the Biodiversity Convention to Human
Health and Food Security, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 55, 70–71 (2012).
41 Whobrey, supra note 6, at 636.
42 Id.
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of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible
importing Member(s).”43
Perhaps most important in regards to patent rights, the 2003 Declaration
expressly permitted the use of parallel exportation. This practice utilizes the
doctrine of patent exhaustion,44 which states that “the unconditioned sale of a
patented article ends the patentee’s monopoly right to control its use.”45 Under
this doctrine, the holder of the underlying patent would only receive payment
for their product one time, either by the exporting country or the importing
country.46 Furthermore, to limit the abuse of this waiver by importing
countries, the 2003 Declaration required that the exporting country only
provide the amount of pharmaceutical drugs necessary to meet the needs of the
importing country and that both countries provide the amount of the specific
drug exported.47 The requirements given by the WTO—provided to clarify
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration—gave importing and exporting countries
a basic framework for a system, now known as a “Paragraph 6 System,” for the
proper use of parallel importation.48
II. AVENUES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO RECEIVE LIFE-SAVING DRUGS
Because of the WTO’s efforts to address the conflict between
pharmaceutical companies’ desire to protect their patent rights and the public
health crises in developing countries, three options are currently available to
allow developing countries the ability to acquire medicines at a potentially
lower price and within the WTO guidelines: compulsory licenses,49 parallel
importation,50 and Paragraph 6 Systems.51
A. Compulsory Licenses
As previously described, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement described the
mechanism of compulsory licensing, which allowed the developing countries
43 World Trade Organization para. 2, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Declaration].
44 See Maitra, supra note 22, at 418; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1240 (9th ed. 2009).
45 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1240 (9th ed. 2009).
46 Maitra, supra note 22, at 418.
47 See Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 236 (2004).
48 Mellino, supra note 18, at 1361–62, 1364.
49 See infra Part II.A.
50 See infra Part II.B.
51 See infra Part II.C.
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to utilize the subject matter of the patent without the patent holder’s
permission.52 However, the use of a patent without the patent holder’s
permission required compliance with many provisions of TRIPS.53 These
provisions provide, among other things, that the “proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time.”54 However, the TRIPS Agreement fails to define
“reasonable commercial terms.”55 Furthermore, even if the negotiations
between the proposed user (i.e., the developing country) and the patent holder
fail, the patent holder must still be paid “adequate remuneration . . . taking into
account the economic value of the authorization.”56 One frequent criticism of
this TRIPS provision is that it does not describe the process in which “adequate
remuneration” is determined.57
In addition, the TRIPS Agreement specifies that negotiations with a patent
holder can be waived in “the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”58
Like the term “adequate remuneration,” the term “national emergency” is not
defined by the TRIPS Agreement and many opponents of compulsory
licensing argue that the term could be used broadly and that developing
countries will use the exception in all circumstances where it could possibly
fit.59 These opponents fear that the use of compulsory licenses will lead to
sharp price reductions in drugs that are not normally seen until generic drugs
are introduced.60 Thus, because of this fear of broad use of the compulsory
licensing mechanism, developed countries have been successful in thwarting
attempts by developing countries to use the broad language in the TRIPS
Agreement.61

52

Barbosa, supra note 39, at 212.
Id.
54 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31(b).
55 Mellino, supra note 18, at 1356.
56 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31(h).
57 Maitra, supra note 22, at 416.
58 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 31(b).
59 Wilson, supra note 1, at 247.
60 Id.
61 Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the Trips Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent
Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 199–200 (2002)
(citing Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of a Drug War, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at A18).
53
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B. Parallel Importation
As previously stated, parallel importation under the TRIPS Agreement
relies on the principle of patent exhaustion.62 Under this practice, the
pharmaceutical drugs that are “marketed by the patent owner . . . with the
patent owner’s permission in one country [are] imported into another country
without the approval of the patent owner.”63 The principle of patent exhaustion
ensures that the patent holder is only compensated for one sale of his patented
product, while the product is re-sold to the developing country that needs it.64
The practice of parallel importing is very controversial, with proponents
arguing that patent holders should lose control of their product after they are
sold65 and opponents arguing that patent exhaustion is inherently detrimental to
the public health of these developing countries because it gives pharmaceutical
countries less incentive to sell their patent products directly to developing
countries.66 Opponents also argue that the practice of parallel importing is
useless to people in developing countries that actually need the drugs as the
governments in these developing countries only sell the drugs received to the
richest people in the country.67 Thus, the opponents of parallel importing argue
that this practice of favoring profits over people is particularly prominent in
developing countries that are “prone to corruption.”68
Perhaps the biggest detracting feature of parallel importation is that
developed countries in the WTO can ban this practice on all drugs
manufactured in their country.69 For example, the United States has two legal
restraints that prevent parallel importation of prescriptions:

62

See supra Part I.C.
Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents: Obligations and Exceptions, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm (last visited Dec. 13,
2012).
64 Whobrey, supra note 6, at 633–34 (stating that “[t]he [pharmaceutical] company has exhausted its
interests in the goods, and they can be resold to other nations for a profit by the original importing country).
65 Id. at 634.
66 Id. at 633 (stating that “[m]any pharmaceutical firms argue that parallel importing decreases
profitability and removes incentive to sell drugs to poor countries at lower prices”).
67 Id. (arguing that “the incentives created by parallel importing encourage governments to favor profits
over people” and “the general public in [developing countries] sees neither the critical medications nor realizes
any benefits or improvements from the sale of drugs”).
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Parallel Imports in Pharmaceuticals: Implications for Competition and
Prices in Developing Countries, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG. 5 (Apr., 2001), http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf.
63
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First, American patent owners are protected from parallel imports by
an explicit right of importation. Second, PI [parallel importation] of
trademarked, prescription drugs are explicitly excluded under terms
of a 1988 law covering pharmaceuticals. An attempt to relax this
restriction through new legislation was passed in 2000 but not
implemented by the Clinton Administration, which cited that it could
not guarantee the purity of imported drugs.70

Opponents of parallel importation suggest that, if parallel importation is
banned, there will be an incentive for pharmaceutical companies to sell to
developing countries as they will lower their prices based on the free-market
demand in that country.71 Thus, as long as parallel importation is possible,
these companies have no incentive to help developing countries if their patent
rights are exhausted by the practice of parallel importation and sold at a
comparably lower price than the free market would dictate.72
C. The Paragraph 6 System
As opposed to parallel importation, which is generally banned in developed
countries, the use of the Paragraph 6 System has become the only avenue for
many developing countries—which do not have sufficient manufacturing
abilities—to receive drugs.73 The 2003 Declaration sets forth different
requirements that the importation and exportation of drugs must satisfy to set
up a Paragraph 6 System.74 For example, the importing country’s requirements
include “specification of ‘the names and expected quantities of the product
needed.’”75 Likewise, the exporting country must publish the amount of the
drug that is being supplied and the destination of the shipment.76 While the use
of a Paragraph 6 System allows developing countries to utilize parallel
importation with developed countries, at the same time, the rights of patent
holders are still abrogated because of the principle of patent exhaustion.

70

Id.
Sykes, supra note 12, at 64.
72 Id. (stating that “[w]hen parallel imports are possible . . . [pharmaceutical companies] will likely be
unwilling to sell at low prices in markets where demand is weak”).
73 Mellino, supra note 18, at 1371–72.
74 Id. at 1362.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1363.
71
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III. THE REALITY OF THE WTO’S EFFORTS UNDER TRIPS AND THE DOHA
DECLARATION
Despite the WTO’s best efforts to balance the rights of patent holders and
increase the access of drugs to developing countries, the health statistics in
developing countries overwhelmingly show that the rights of patent holders are
succeeding, much to the detriment of the people in the developing countries.77
One attempt by a developing country to curtail the AIDS problem resulted in a
lawsuit by developed countries and pharmaceutical countries.78 Furthermore,
increasing pressure after the passage of the Doha Declaration and 2003 WTO
resolution resulted in a significant decrease in generic drugs provided by
India.79 Finally, the WTO’s description of a “Paragraph 6 System,” which has
been touted as a breakthrough from the 2003 Declaration, has thus far resulted
in only one successful implementation.80
A. Health Statistics from Developing Countries
Despite the best intentions by the WTO to reduce the disparity in deaths
from treatable diseases between developing and developed countries, people
are still dying from treatable diseases in developing countries. For example, in
2012, the WTO indicated that “[t]he highest malaria mortality rates are being
seen in countries that have the highest rates of extreme poverty.”81
Furthermore, forty-seven percent of the 103 million malaria cases in 2012 exist
in six African nations: Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique and Cote d’Ivoire.82 Furthermore,
in 2012, the WTO reported that more than ninety-five of tuberculosis cases and
deaths were in developing countries.83 In regards to the spread of HIV and
AIDS, the numbers are even more staggering. The Foundation for AIDS
Research estimated that “[m]ore than two-thirds (70%) of all people living
with HIV . . . live in sub-Saharan Africa—including 91% of the world’s HIV-

77

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
79 See infra Part III.C.
80 See infra Part III.D.
81 World Malaria Report 2012 Fact Sheet, WHO 1 (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.who.int/malaria/
publications/world_malaria_report_2012/wmr2012_factsheet.pdf.
82 Id.
83 Tuberculosis Fact sheet No. 104, WHO (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.who.int /mediacentre/factsheets/
fs104/en/.
78
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positive children.”84 Furthermore, an estimated 1.5 million people became
newly infected with HIV.85 Despite the steps taken by the WTO in 1994, 2001,
and 2003, there still appears to be people in developing countries who cannot
gain access to drugs that treat HIV as well as drugs that can cure diseases like
malaria and tuberculosis.
B. 1997 South Africa Patent Dispute
A large reason for the ever-present disease problem in developing countries
can be traced back to resistance by developed countries in allowing developing
countries to utilize the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement. For example,
shortly after the TRIPS Agreement was passed in 1994, South Africa
attempted to utilize compulsory licensing and parallel importation to address
its growing HIV/AIDs problem.86 The backlash from pharmaceutical
companies and developed countries was massive.
In the early 1990s, South Africa became the country with “the highest
absolute number of people living with HIV/AIDS.”87 Despite the growing HIV
population, the majority of South Africans suffering with the disease could not
afford even three months of drugs to treat their disease on one year’s salary.88
Thus, the parliament in South Africa passed the South African Medical and
Related Substances Control Act (MRSCA) in 1997.89 In this legislation, the
South African Health Minister was given the power to override drug patents
and authorize compulsory licensing and parallel importation in an effort to
reduce the prices of HIV/AIDS antiretroviral drugs.90
The backlash to this piece of legislation from pharmaceutical companies
and developed countries resulted in a lawsuit, filed in South African courts by
more than 40 multinational manufacturers and the United States, challenging
84 Statistics: Worldwide, FOUND. AIDS RES. (Nov. 2012), http://www.amfar.org/about_hiv_and_aids/
facts_and_stats/statistics__worldwide/.
85 Id.
86 Wilson, supra note 1, at 254–55.
87 William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy: A Case Study in
Patent Law and Policy, HARV. L. SCH. 3 (Feb. 10, 2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%
20Africa.pdf.
88 Id. (stating that “with an average annual income or $2,600, most South Africans suffering with
HIV/AIDS could not afford to pay for treatment with antiretroviral drugs, which at that time cost about $1,000
a month”).
89 Mercurio, supra note 47, at 223.
90 Andrea M. Curti, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Unlikely Weapon in the Fight
Against AIDS, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 469, 476–77 (2001).
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the MRSCA.91 These multinational companies stated that the use of
compulsory licenses and parallel importing was in violation of the TRIPS
Agreement, despite the language in the TRIPS Agreement allowing for
compulsory licensing and implicitly authorizing parallel importing.92 In
addition, the United States withheld trade benefits from South Africa and
threatened to further impose trade sanctions if the country did not repeal the
Act.93 Despite the lawsuits and threat of trade sanction, South African
President Nelson Mandela signed the law into effect in 1997.94 It was not until
worldwide public outcry over the lawsuit95—and the offer from India to
provide South Africa with generic HIV/AIDS drugs at a price that
pharmaceutical companies could match—that the lawsuit was dropped.96 After
the lawsuit was dropped and the crisis had settled, the WTO passed the Doha
Declaration and clarified its stance on TRIPS and the ability of developing
countries to utilize compulsory licensing and parallel importation.97
C. Consequences of India’s Halt of Generic Drug Production in 2005
Just as India was able to provide generic drugs to South Africa in 1997,
India enjoyed the benefits of relaxed patent law compliance standards that
were granted to many developing countries until 2005.98 After 2005, however,
India became fully compliant with the TRIPS Agreement and, thus, the
production of generic drugs under the relaxed standards ceased.99 In addition,
exports of all generic drugs stopped.100 As a result, developing countries were
forced to follow the mechanisms described in the TRIPS Agreement and the
Doha Declaration: compulsory licenses, parallel importation, or a Paragraph 6
System.101

91

Wilson, supra note 1, at 255.
Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 87, at 5.
93 Id. at 7.
94 Id.
95 Wilson, supra note 1, at 255–56 (stating that “[t]he pharmaceutical companies eventually dropped the
case in 2001, but only in response to the worldwide public outcry against the action”).
96 Curti, supra note 90, at 477 (noting that Cipla (an Indian producer of generic drugs) offered to sell
AIDS medications to South Africa and this prompted Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck to match the Indian
drug producer’s price).
97 Wilson, supra note 1, at 256; Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 87, at 15.
98 Curti, supra note 90, at 477–78.
99 Yelpaala, supra note 40, at 91–92.
100 Id.
101 Mellino, supra note 18, at 1370–72.
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The use of compulsory licenses slowly began to be implemented by
developing countries, although none of the countries that utilized these licenses
were considered least developed countries (LDCs).102 The reason for the
limited use of compulsory licenses is likely the lack of manufacturing
capabilities in the developing countries that desperately need the drugs.103
Thus, the only avenue for these developing countries to receive drugs at a
lower cost is the use of parallel importation from the set-up of a Paragraph 6
System.104
D. The Use of Parallel Importation by Developing Countries in the Paragraph
6 System
As stated earlier, the use of compulsory licenses under TRIPS was not
feasible for most developing countries because the agreement specified that the
drugs manufactured were for domestic consumption only.105 This limitation,
coupled with the fact that most countries have banned parallel importation,
meant that the only real avenue for developing countries to receive
pharmaceutical drugs was the formation of a Paragraph 6 System with a
developed country.106 Shortly after the 2003 Declaration, however, many
countries—including the United states, Australia, and New Zealand—stated
that they would not set up a Paragraph 6 System with developing countries,
even if the system met the specific requirements and guidelines established in
the 2003 Declaration.107 Furthermore, other countries—including China, Israel,
Turkey, and Mexico—stated that they would only use the system in cases of
national emergencies.108
In fact, Canada is the only developed country to set up a Paragraph 6
System—known as Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR)—with
developing countries, and Rwanda is the only country to take advantage of the
CAMR.109 Canada set up the CAMR in 2004 in order to “facilitate timely
102 Id. at 1371 (noting that, while Thailand, Brazil, and the Philippines began to utilize compulsory
licenses, “these countries are not [as] financially destitute” as LDCs, or least developed countries).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1371–72.
105 See supra Part I.C.
106 See Mellino, supra note 18, at 1361–62 (stating that “[t]he 2003 Decision specifically took into
account the instruction of the Doha Declaration to find a solution to the problem of the difficulties that ‘WTO
members with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector could face in making
effective use of compulsory licenses’”).
107 Id. at 1365.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1372.
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access to generic versions of patented drugs and medical devices, especially
those needed by least-developed or developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS,
malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases.”110 The CAMR “requires the good
will of pharmaceutical companies to participate in the Regime” by granting
compulsory licenses to Canada for the manufacture and export of generic
versions of patented drugs to developing countries without the capacity to
manufacture these drugs.111 The effects of the system were utilized by Rwanda
in 2008:
In 2008, upon the authorization of GlaxoSmithKline and the
Canadian subsidiaries of Shire and Boehringer Ingelheim, general
drug maker Apotex manufactured a “fixed dose triple combination
antiretroviral medicine” for export to Rwanda. Apotex has since sent
out two total shipments of the AIDS drug to Rwanda.112

Notwithstanding these successful shipments to Rwanda, no other country has
utilized the CAMR.113
IV. REPAIRING THE FAILED SYSTEM SET UP BY THE WTO
Despite the WTO’s desire to adopt legislation in the hopes of getting lifesaving drugs to the world’s poorest people, the realities described above show
that the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and the 2003 Declaration are
failing.114 Critics of the WTO’s actions state that the TRIPS Agreement and the
Doha Declaration “fail[] to address” the various “political and educational
barriers” in developing countries and, instead, focus on “penalizing” the
pharmaceutical companies by depriving them of their patent rights.115
Furthermore, critics state that the language used in the TRIPS Agreement is too
broad to have any real force in international trade.116 The WTO will need to
address these failures by drafting another declaration that adds some teeth to
110 Canada’s Access to Medicine Regime: Background, CANADA’S ACCESS TO MEDICINE REGIME (March
13, 2008), http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/intro/context-eng.php.
111 Id.
112 Mellino, supra note 18, at 1373.
113 Id.
114 See supra Part III.
115 Barbosa, supra note 39, at 236 (stating that the Doha Declaration “fails to address developing nations’
political and educational barriers to pharmaceuticals and resorts to penalizing the industry that brings lifesaving medicines to the world”).
116 Mercurio, supra note 47, at 236–37 (stating that the TRIPS Agreement “fails to satisfactorily resolve
[the following] . . . (i) the scope of diseases and product coverage; (ii) countries that would be eligible to use
the system; (iii) ensuring adequate remuneration; and (iv) safeguarding the system against diversion of drugs
into other market”).

MOHAN GALLEYSFINAL

2018

1/30/2015 7:48 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

the language used in the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and the
2003 Declaration.
A. Developing Country Barriers to Drugs & Patent Holder’s Violated Rights
The use of compulsory licenses by developing countries is a significant
penalty to patent holders. By allowing developing countries to bypass patent
rights after failed negotiations with pharmaceutical companies, these
companies may be discouraged from developing drugs and continuing research
for diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, that typically only affect
developing countries because there is no financial benefit for this research.117 It
costs a pharmaceutical company hundreds of millions of dollars to bring a drug
to market118 and the number of new drugs seeking approval by the FDA is
already declining.119 With little chance of profiting off any new drugs for
diseases that primarily affect developing countries, the number of new drugs
that are brought to market will continue to decline.
Furthermore, patent rights and high prices may not even be the most
significant barriers to providing life-saving drugs to developing countries.120
To begin, developing countries spend one-tenth of their budget on
pharmaceutical drugs for their people.121 This lack of spending by governments
leads to increased out-of-pocket spending—as much as ninety percent of the
average person’s total out-of-pocket expenditures—by individuals for drugs
they need.122 The large out-of-pocket expenditure for drugs leads to less money
for food, clothing, and housing, thereby prompting many to equate illness as a

117 Barbosa, supra note 39, at 245 (arguing that “[i]f companies do not envision that research into new
therapies for HIV/AIDS, malaria or other diseases typically affecting developing countries will be profitable,
they will stop spending valuable research dollars for the development of drugs used predominantly in the
developing world”).
118 Id. at 244.
119 Id. at 245 (stating that “the number of new drugs seeking approval by the FDA is already declining”
and “[i]t is becoming increasingly difficult for pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop new therapies,
resulting in few innovative drugs being launched into the market”).
120 See id. at 248 (stating that “[p]rice is not the only hurdle in eradicating disease in developing
countries” and that “‘poverty, corruption, and lack of health-care infrastructure’ are significant obstacles that
poorer countries face”).
121 Jillian Clare Cohen, Pharmaceuticals and corruption: a risk assessment, WORLDBANK.ORG 1 (Aug.
11, 2005), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corecourse2007/Pharmaceuticals.pdf (stating
that developed countries “generally devote US $239 in annual spending on drugs per head, compared to less
than US $20 in developing countries”).
122 Id. (stating that, in developing countries, “pharmaceutical expenditures are anywhere from 50-90
percent of total individual out-of-pocket expenditures”).
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major cause of household poverty.123 Further exacerbating the problem is the
fact that, even when people can afford these drugs, the absence of proper
healthcare providers means that the right drugs do not get to the right
people.124 For complex drugs such as retrovirals to treat HIV and AIDS,
developing countries do not have the infrastructure to provide laboratories that
can monitor needed blood tests or doctors that can properly administer the
retrovirals.125
The lack of infrastructure and decreased government spending on
pharmaceuticals can largely be traced back to corruption in developing
countries.126 Government officials in developing countries are susceptible to
taking “kickbacks for purchasing medicines”127 and, when this occurs, officials
tend to hoard these drugs or select the wrong kind of medicines for their
people.128 The following are just a few of the ways that corruption can affect
the access to pharmaceutical drugs:
[P]roducts can be diverted or stolen at various points in the
distribution system; officials may demand ‘fees’ for approving
products or facilities, for clearing customs procedures, or for setting
prices; violations of industry marketing code practices may distort
medical professionals’ prescribing practices; demand for favours may
be placed on suppliers as a condition for prescribing medicines; and
counterfeit or other forms of sub-standard medicines may be allowed
to circulate.129

Thus, even with the provision in TRIPS that aimed to lower prices or work
around patent holders’ rights in cases of emergency, the lack of infrastructure
and corruption will continue to be a barrier for the poorest people in
developing countries to receive life-saving drugs.

123

See id.
Barbosa, supra note 39, at 248 (arguing that “the absence of proper health care providers presents a
formidable barrier to drug access”).
125 Id.
126 Cohen, supra note 121, at 77.
127 Id. (stating that “when officials accept kickbacks for purchasing medicines, pharmaceutical
expenditure is reduced and fewer of the right drugs get to the right people when they need them”).
128 Transparency International, Summary sheet: Corruption in the pharmaceutical sector,
GLOBALAGING.ORG 1, (2006) http://www.globalaging.org/health/world/2006/World%20HE%20Feb1%20
Pharma%20Corruption%2 (phcorrupt).pdf.
129 Id.
124
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B. Unsatisfactory Language in the TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration
Apart from the ambiguous terms in the TRIPS Agreement that have
previously been discussed,130 the language in the Doha Declaration has also
been accused by many as too broad and unsatisfactory in guiding all WTO
countries with regards to the utilization of compulsory licensing and parallel
importation.131 To begin, the largest undefined term in the Doha Declaration is
that of a “public health problem.”132 Under paragraph 1 of the Doha
Declaration, the WTO recognized the gravity of “public health problems
afflicting many developing and least developed countries, especially those
resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”133
However, by only listing those specific diseases, the WTO leaves open for
interpretation what other diseases a country could consider a “public health
problem.”134 Thus, critics argue that a patent holder could be forced into a
compulsory license for a drug treating a disease that is arbitrarily determined to
be a health emergency, such as erectile dysfunction.135 While this example may
seem to be extreme, it does illustrate the lack of direction that the Doha
Declaration gives and also indicates how a country could use the lack of
direction in a manner that is not in the spirit of the WTO’s goals.136
Another ambiguity in the WTO’s action occurs in Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration, which states that countries can utilize parallel importation of
drugs under a Paragraph 6 System if the country has “no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector” or if the country has “difficulties
making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS agreement.”137
There is no language in the Doha Declaration that states a country must face a
genuine health problem and must lack the resources to acquire the drugs from
the patent holders.138 Thus, critics of this language argue that countries that do
130

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Mercurio, supra note 47, at 236–37 (arguing that “several paragraphs of [TRIPS] lend
themselves to the possibility of abuse or are otherwise unsatisfactory and potentially destabilizing to the entire
system of compulsory licensing”).
132 See Doha Declaration, supra note 34, para. 1.
133 Id.
134 Mercurio, supra note 47, at 239.
135 Id. (arguing that “without any hesitation, a country could declare a health emergency and be granted a
compulsory license on any drug, including Viagra”).
136 Id. (arguing that the use of a compulsory license on Viagra is an example of a result that “is contrary to
the spirit of the Doha Declaration”).
137 Doha Declaration, supra note 34, para. 6. See Mercurio, supra note 47, at 240.
138 Mercurio, supra note 47, at 240.
131
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not have a health emergency, but merely choose not to manufacture drugs in
their country, can utilize the Paragraph 6 System to receive drugs at a cheaper
price.139
C. Proposed Regulations to Correct the WTO’s Actions
As shown above, the actions of the WTO to balance health emergencies
and uphold patent rights have failed in accomplishing either goal. Allowing
individual developing countries to decide the terms of what constitutes an
“emergency” and utilize compulsory licenses or parallel importation
deliberately works around patent holders’ rights and has the potential to stunt
research on diseases that are currently incurable. Furthermore, statistics show
that developing countries are still not receiving the drugs that they need to
solve national health emergencies. Thus, the WTO must find a way to work
within its constraints and power in order to give more teeth to the TRIPS
Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and the 2003 Declaration. Until the WTO
does this, millions of people will continue to die.
I propose that the WTO establish an international body from which all
developing countries can get access to pharmaceutical drugs, but only in health
emergencies. Having individual developing countries—and potential exporting
countries—negotiate with patent holders does not help either the developing
country receive the drugs nor does it uphold a patent holder’s rights. Thus, an
international body must be established to both determine when a health crisis
exists in a specific country and oversee the distribution of the life-saving drugs
to that country. This will require an international agreement among all
countries to forgo patent holders’ rights in certain, limited circumstances so
that people do not continue to die.
An area of regulation that is far beyond the scope of the WTO is the
infrastructure and corruption in developing countries. However, setting up an
international body to oversee the distribution of life-saving drugs to developing
countries will cut down on the back-door government corruption and kickbacks to corrupt officials. This international organization can also oversee that
the needed health infrastructure is provided in these developing countries for
people to receive life-saving drugs from qualified health professionals.

139 See id. (stating that a lack of manufacturing capabilities, even when the country does not “lack the
resources to purchase needed medicines from the manufacturer,” could allow for rich or healthy countries to
utilize a Paragraph 6 System in order to obtain drugs at a cheaper cost).

MOHAN GALLEYSFINAL

2022

1/30/2015 7:48 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Furthermore, in order for the WTO to give this new international more
guidance and enforce the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and the
2003 Declaration, the WTO must provide greater guidance on the broad and
ambiguous terms described in this paper. The WTO must begin by clarifying
the meanings of the terms “adequate remuneration,” “public health problem,”
“national emergency,” and “reasonable commercial terms.” Until the language
in the TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration is clarified, no organization or
country will be able to properly enforce these agreements in the spirit the WTO
intended.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while the WTO has taken steps in an attempt to balance the
need for life-saving drugs to be provided to developing countries and the right
of patent holders to profit off these drugs, the end result of these steps is
insufficient. Patent holders are being deprived of their exclusive rights to the
drugs they invented and people in developing countries are still not receiving
the drugs they need. Thus, an international body must be established to both
oversee the distribution of these life-saving drugs to developing countries as
well as ensure that a patent holder’s rights are upheld absent a national health
emergency.

